arXiv:2611.06286v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The web cannot tell whether a request comes from a person or from a program. Sites have checked the network address and puzzles in its place, and both have given way: automated traffic exceeds human traffic, and puzzles are solved for pay and by agents. This paper proposes the Clear Human Web, the part of the public web that sites open only to clients a person vouches for. A person's wallet presents their person identification data (PID) to one issuer, the only party that registers as a relying party, and receives a bounded number of blind-signed tokens, proofs of personhood that carry no attribute. The browser spends one token at each site that runs the gate, and the site learns that a valid token of a trusted issuer was spent, and nothing else. No field is added to the PID, no protocol is introduced, no site registers, and the publisher of a site holds the same proof as its readers. We define the Clear Human Web through five properties and seven adversaries, and state which properties the construction satisfies against each adversary. The identities a person can hold on one site in an epoch are bounded to k. The bound holds once the wallet limits a person to one pseudonym at the issuer. In the optimum k = 1, and a zero-knowledge proof of PID possession and a pseudonym per site replace the tokens.