arXiv:2611.22408v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Security-minded verification of autonomous and robotic systems presupposes an attacker, yet the path from a threat catalogue to a checkable attacker model is still traversed by hand. This research preview presents the theory and construction of a pipeline that mechanises it. Each leaf of an attack tree is mapped to a CAPEC attack pattern and written in first-order logic as a rule: the attacker's prerequisites imply the attack's effect. Casting the pattern as such a rule is what makes it operational - its variables can be bound to a specific system's parts, and its prerequisites can then be tested against that system under a chosen configuration of security controls. Binding is our means of verifying whether a system is vulnerable to a given attack: from a bound pattern we derive an attacker model, turn its effect into a temporal-logic property, and check that property against the system with and without a countermeasure, reporting the control that defeats the attack. We describe the signature, schemas, profiles for approach, and explore how CAPEC can support reasoning about robotics security.