AI & ML
Language Model Security Modules: Turning LLM Interpretability into Runtime Defense
arXiv cs.CR0 views
arXiv:2608.25697v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are served behind layered defenses such as alignment and guardrail models, yet jailbreaks still get through. Interpretability research looks inside the model, where methods such as probes and sparse autoencoders expose signals of harmful content during generation. A signal alone, however, is not a defense. To become one, the serving system must tie each signal to the right request, apply the policy as declared, and release output only when the policy allows. Today, defenses built on such signals handle these duties on their own, so every new detector needs its own integration. Yet none of these duties depends on how a signal is computed. We present Language Model Security Modules (LMSM), which adapts the design of Linux Security Modules to LLM serving and carries out these duties once in a shared mediation path. The path hosts pluggable backends that turn model internals into evidence and policies that decide what that evidence allows. Each policy declares the evidence and evaluations it needs, and LMSM provides exactly these for each request and verifies that they took place, so a failure is never mistaken for permission. Protection therefore remains cheap and correct under common serving optimizations. We evaluate LMSM in vLLM, with both eager and compiled execution, on Qwen3-4B and Gemma-3-4B with fitted probes, a released transcoder, and a released sparse autoencoder. With vLLM's default optimizations on, every backend keeps at least 96% of native throughput, and all of them share the same mediation path. On Qwen3-4B, a representative probe-based policy cuts HarmBench attack success from 39.4% to 3.3% while XSTest false refusals rise from 0.8% to 3.1%. LMSM lets existing and future interpretability methods become runtime defenses without rebuilding the serving path.
Source:https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.25697PreviousIs Randomness Necessary for Adaptive Data Analysis?NextThreshold Choice, Not Sample Size, Bounds Trustless Verification of Nondeterministic Compound AI Workflows
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