arXiv:2607.27951v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models now help professionals in fields such as cybersecurity and biology, yet the same answers would help an attacker. Deployers rely on misuse safeguards to keep such answers from attackers. We find that these safeguards share a high-risk vulnerability: they decide whether to release an answer from what users write, including the professional identity or purpose they claim, and anyone can write such a claim. Threat reports from model vendors and security firms show that attackers who fabricate a professional identity or purpose already exploit this vulnerability to cause serious harm. The vulnerability is also widespread across the state of the art: every defense proposed in 129 papers from the latest editions of 12 top venues has it. Safeguard research studies the wrong object: it treats harm as a property of the text of a request, although the same text can come from a professional or an attacker. Current safeguard benchmarks therefore cannot reveal the vulnerability: a safeguard can score high on them and still give dangerous answers to attackers. Because the vulnerability lies in what users write, no improvement in how safeguards judge that writing can close it. Under the patch we propose, large language models can help professionals without giving dangerous capabilities to anyone who merely claims to be one.