AI & ML
On the Same Track: Privacy Leaks in Electric Rail Transport via Magnetic Fields
arXiv cs.CR0 views
arXiv:2611.18312v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Inertial sensors of smartphones are a well-known privacy risk, as they allow inferring sensitive user movements and activity without explicit permissions. Among these sensors, the magnetometer has received little attention, as it is assumed to measure mainly the Earth's magnetic field. In this paper, we show that electric trains generate distinctive magnetic fields that can be captured by a smartphone magnetometer. Apps deployed on the device can access these signals without user permission, enabling two novel attacks on passenger privacy: First, we are able to determine whether the user is riding an electric train (transport mode detection). Second, we can infer whether other victims are aboard the same train due to shared patterns in the magnetic field (colocation prediction). In an empirical evaluation across 217 train rides, we demonstrate that both attacks are effective, confirming a real-world threat. We discuss countermeasures and argue that magnetometer access should require explicit user permission in mobile operating systems.
Source:https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.18312PreviousPrivacyPR: A Dataset of Real-World Privacy Fixes for Benchmarking Privacy-Aware Code ReviewNextInformation-Theoretic Threshold Designated-Verifier Digital Signatures for Resource-Constrained Devices
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