If your Synology NAS runs DSM 7.2 and can be reached from the internet, CVE-2026-120382 is a CVSS 9.8 bug that needs no password and no click. As of today, Synology's own advisory table still lists the DSM 7.2 fix as "Ongoing". Checking your build takes one command (Step 1), and you can apply the official mitigation in under a minute (Step 3).

Synology published it as Synology-SA-26:21 on 2026-11-19. It's an argument injection (CWE-88) in the OAuth API of DSM. Synology's summary: it "allows remote attackers to read or write arbitrary files and conduct denial-of-service attacks." The vector is CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. In other words, anyone who can reach the box over the network can read and write arbitrary files on the machine that holds your backups, without logging in and without anyone clicking anything. That's about as bad as a NAS bug gets.

Which DSM versions are affected by CVE-2026-120382

Here's the advisory table as of revision 2 (2026-11-20):

Product Severity Fixed release
DSM 7.4 Critical Upgrade to 7.4.1-90080-2 or above
DSM 7.3 Critical Upgrade to 7.3.2-86009-6 or above
DSM 7.2.2 Critical Ongoing (upgrading to 7.3.2-86009-6 or above is recommended)
DSM 7.2.1 Critical Ongoing (upgrading to 7.3.2-86009-6 or above is recommended)
DSM 7.1 Critical Ongoing
BeeStation OS 1.5 Critical Ongoing
DSM Enterprise 1.0, SRM 1.2/1.3, APM 1.2/2.0 Not affected N/A

The CVE description on the same page doesn't match that table. It says the bug affects DSM versions before these builds:

6.2.4-25556-9 7.1.1-42962-10 7.2.1-69057-14 7.2.2-72806-11 7.3.2-86009-6 7.4.1-90080-2 

So the CVE text names fixed builds for 6.2.4, 7.1.1, 7.2.1 and 7.2.2, and the table right above it says those fixes are still "Ongoing". DSM 6.2 isn't in the table at all. Only 7.3 and 7.4 line up in both places, and revision 2 of the advisory only updated the fix status for those two.

My reading: the CVE record was filed with the build numbers Synology intends to ship, and the table reflects what you can actually download. In the Hacker News thread, mattbee's older unit still showed "Ongoing", and akerl_ checked and found "there still isn't a patched release available." Until Package Center or the download center offers you one of those builds, treat 7.2.x and 7.1 as unpatched, whatever the CVE text says.

Step 1: find your exact DSM build number

In the web UI: Control Panel → Info Center → General. You'll see something like DSM 7.2.2-72806 Update 3. The number after the second dash in the CVE list is that "Update" number, so 7.2.2-72806-11 means 7.2.2-72806 Update 11.

Over SSH it's quicker, and it scripts nicely if you have more than one box:

cat /etc.defaults/VERSION 

Look at productversion, buildnumber and smallfixnumber. Compare them against the table:

  • 7.4 and below 7.4.1-90080-2: vulnerable, patch exists.
  • 7.3 and below 7.3.2-86009-6: vulnerable, patch exists.
  • 7.2.1, 7.2.2, 7.1: vulnerable, patch status "Ongoing".
  • BeeStation OS 1.5: vulnerable, "Ongoing".

Step 2: update, or jump to 7.3

If you're on 7.3 or 7.4, go to Control Panel → Update & Restore and install the fixed build. That's all you need there.

If you're on 7.2.x, Synology's own recommendation is to upgrade to 7.3.2-86009-6 or above instead of waiting. That's a major version jump on a storage appliance, so take a config backup first (Control Panel → Update & Restore → Configuration Backup) and check your Hyper Backup tasks actually completed recently. Also check that your model is offered 7.3 at all. Older units don't get every release; dj68k on HN still has an 1813+ serving data on DSM 7.1.1, and for a box like that the 7.3 escape hatch doesn't exist.

Upgrades aren't free either. madduci on HN complained that the upgrade brings other breaking changes along with the fix, like H.265 (HEVC) decoding being offloaded to clients instead of the server. If your Plex setup depends on server-side decode, read the 7.3 release notes before you click.

Step 3: deactivate the OAuth Service package (do this now)

This is the official mitigation, and if you only do one thing from this post today, do this one, whatever version you're on. The advisory's wording: "Deactivate the OAuth Service package."

Package Center → Installed → OAuth Service → Stop. Some people in the HN thread suggested going further and uninstalling it. mattbee said they had never used OAuth and that the package seems to be installed by default. I hate that kind of attack surface most, because you never chose to run it.

From SSH you can confirm it's there and check its state:

sudo synopkg list | grep -i oauth 

Then stop it by the package name that command shows you. After a DSM update, check again that it's still stopped.

If something you rely on breaks after stopping it, you'll know you were using it. Stopping it and watching is the honest approach.

Step 4: is your NAS actually reachable from the internet?

The vulnerable API needs no authentication, so what decides whether you get hit is who can reach DSM. Home labs usually get this part wrong.

Check these three places:

  1. QuickConnect, under Control Panel → External Access → QuickConnect. If it's enabled, your DSM login is reachable through Synology's relay from anywhere with your QuickConnect ID. Turn it off unless you have a reason you can say out loud.
  2. Port forwards on your router. Log into it and look for anything forwarding to the NAS, especially 5000/5001 (DSM HTTP/HTTPS) and 443. Also check Control Panel → External Access → Router Configuration, because DSM can set up UPnP forwards for you without you noticing.
  3. The reverse proxy. If you publish anything through DSM's built-in reverse proxy, that's internet exposure too. KiwiJohnno mentioned on HN that Synology's built-in reverse proxy also had a vulnerability the same week.

Then test from outside: put your phone on mobile data, Wi-Fi off, and try https://<your-public-ip>:5001. If the DSM login page loads, so can everyone's scanner.

Take the management UI off the internet

In 2026, a DSM login page on the public internet is something you chose, and I think it's the wrong call. harrouet on HN once put a fully patched Synology in their DMZ and not even a few hours later it was mining bitcoins. greggsy wrote that "/r/synology has been a sea of compromise posts these past weeks" and blamed Synology for "making it so easy for clueless users to do this."

Synology deserves that criticism, since QuickConnect is one checkbox. But you're the one who ticked it.

The fix is boring, and it works: install Tailscale or run WireGuard, and close every forward. One catch with Tailscale: per Tailscale's Synology docs, the package in Synology's Package Center "is no longer supported," so grab the official SPK for your CPU architecture from pkgs.tailscale.com instead. The same page walks through a scheduled Task Scheduler job (daily, for example) running as root to keep it current:

tailscale update --yes 

whilenot-dev pointed out that WireGuard "does not even respond at all to unauthorized clients," so the port never shows up in scanner results. Phone photo backup still works with an always-on or on-demand VPN profile.

If you truly need something public, like Plex for family, expose that one service through a proper reverse proxy with auth in front, not DSM itself.

The 2-minute checklist

  • [ ] Note your build from Info Center or cat /etc.defaults/VERSION
  • [ ] On 7.3/7.4: install 7.3.2-86009-6 / 7.4.1-90080-2 or above
  • [ ] On 7.2.x/7.1/BeeStation: stop OAuth Service, plan the 7.3 upgrade
  • [ ] Disable QuickConnect and UPnP if you don't need them
  • [ ] Remove port forwards to 5000/5001
  • [ ] Test from mobile data that the login page no longer loads
  • [ ] Re-check OAuth Service after every DSM update

So, is your Synology reachable from the internet right now, or only over a VPN or Tailscale? And if it's exposed, what's the reason you'd defend in the comments?

Sources