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Playing the SMR Game with Existential Honesty
arXiv cs.CR0 views
arXiv:2611.24586v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: State machine replication protocols are usually proven secure in the honest-Byzantine setting, which requires an honest supermajority of validators. Deployed systems offer no such guarantee: validators participate for profit and may deviate from the protocol whenever doing so increases their gains. In our work, every validator is rational or Byzantine, and none is honest. Rational validators may collude with each other and with the Byzantine ones, who may also bribe them to deviate. Known impossibility results show that, without honest validators, clients that decide whether to accept a transaction based on a non-interactive certificate and without further communication cannot be kept safe. To bypass these results, we let clients relay the certificates they receive to full nodes and wait before confirming transactions. We also assume that one full node, whose identity is unknown, is honest and always online. Under this assumption, we build a finalization layer over any certifiable quorum-based protocol in a synchronous network. Clients run an existing freezing gadget and fetch past certificates from the honest full node, which makes the protocol \emph{always-safe}: no two honest clients confirm conflicting ledgers, for any strategy of the validators. We incentivize participation through rewards, which the adversary may use to bribe rational validators into censoring transactions. In this setting, we formalize censorship and characterize it tightly: paying only with his rewards, the adversary censors less than a $\bw$ fraction of the available fees at each height, where $\bw$ is the fraction of the quorum he signs, and every coin of censorship beyond that comes from his own funds.
Source:https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.24586PreviousProbing agent overeagerness in realistic settings with continuation auditsNextRobust, Lightweight Locally Differentially Private Histogram Estimation and the Role of Dropout Attacks
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