AI & ML
SCR: Detecting Backdoor-Poisoned Samples through Clean-Reference Residuals
arXiv cs.CR0 views
arXiv:2611.24558v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Deep neural networks are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, in which adversaries manipulate model predictions by injecting poisoned samples into training data. Detecting these samples remains challenging because legitimate semantic variation can obscure poisoning-related signals in learned representations. Consequently, class-level statistics used by existing detectors may flag benign feature deviations while overlooking poisoned samples that blend into the class distribution. In this paper, we propose Semantic Counterfactual Residualization (SCR), which uses a small set of clean reference samples to account for benign variation through sample-specific feature reconstruction. SCR identifies poisoned samples by detecting coherent deviations from these clean baselines, without requiring prior knowledge of the attacks. We evaluate SCR through experiments covering twelve dirty-label and clean-label attacks across CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and Tiny ImageNet. With a small clean-reference set, SCR achieves attack-averaged true positive rates above 99.5\% and false positive rates below 2\% on each dataset, outperforming eight representative detection baselines in macro-TPR.
Source:https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.24558PreviousRECLAIM: Robot-Vision-Informed Adversarial Patch Defense via Embodied Attention FeedbackNext"I Don't Think It's a Scam": A First Look at Family Intervention Barriers in Elder Abuse Discussions on Reddit and Baidu Tieba
Related posts
The Songless Archive Is a Better Listening Log Than a Playlist
0dev.to
AI makes it easier to understand the whole project
0dev.to
ChatGPT Has No Secret Codes. These Features Are What Help
0dev.to
How to Check a Freelancer's AI Work Before You Pay Them
0dev.to
I scanned 277 public MCP servers. Here's what 90% of them miss.
0dev.to

The JSON Parsed. Is It Right? How to Score LLM Data Extraction
0dev.to