Your AI Agent Works in a Demo. But Can You Trust It in Production?
Building and benchmarking a production-ready enterprise AI agent — with the numbers, the failures and the code
Key findings (100 synthetic scenarios, 3 trials each)
- A hardened agent achieved 95.6% strict task success versus 74.7% for a well-prompted baseline (+21 points, pre-registered scorer; 97.6% vs 78.5% after LLM-assisted, author-approved adjudication of disputed runs), and stayed consistent when all three trials had to succeed (93.9% vs 67.7%).
- In the scenarios where it was tested, user identity did the data-access security work; the workflow did most of the correctness work. Calling the back-end services with the user's token instead of a service account stopped every unauthorized retrieval in those 27 scenarios (18 of 18 runs) — because the services enforced the user's scope. The variant's policy guard could refuse write calls but never refused one in any of its 84 runs. The workflow — approval binding, deterministic evidence, grounding — supplied the remaining accuracy and the approval handling.
- The hardened agent was faster at the median and used about 5× fewer tokens, because it makes fewer, smaller model calls.
- It also failed in ways I did not design for: it recorded a false approval reason that the baseline refused, and it overfit to the scenarios I tuned it on.
- One model, one provider, one domain. Section 11 separates what the code guarantees from what depends on the model.
About this study: all data is synthetic, and the system was built and benchmarked for this article; it has not been deployed in a real enterprise. Section 6 lists what the benchmark implements and what a production deployment would add. Model: anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5 via OpenRouter, upstream pinned to Anthropic with fallbacks disabled and require_parameters on; no temperature (the endpoint does not accept one); reasoning effort: "none"; 800 output tokens per call. Disclosure: the model under test and the AI assistant that helped me write the benchmark code — and that proposed the adjudication overrides described in Section 10 — are both Anthropic products. Code version: the benchmark ran on version 1.0.0 of the companion repository; corrections made after the run are in version 1.0.1 and change no published result.
1. The demo that passed
The demo went well. Someone typed "Check invoice INV-10482, explain why it is blocked, and tell me what needs to happen next," and the agent did exactly that. It pulled the invoice and the purchase order, found that line 1 was billed at 104.10 against a PO price of 102.00 — 2.06%, just over a 2% tolerance — and recommended that the buyer amend the PO or request a credit memo. Correct, grounded, polite.
(If accounts payable is new to you: before an invoice is paid, it is "three-way matched" against the purchase order — what was ordered and at what price — and the goods receipt — what actually arrived. A mismatch beyond a set tolerance puts the invoice on hold until someone fixes the cause.)
Then I replayed the same agent against the situations a real accounts-payable desk produces every day:
- An AP clerk in one business unit asked about an invoice belonging to another. The agent replied, correctly, that it could not share the details. It had already fetched the full record into its context window — and in a third of those runs it told the user the invoice's status anyway.
- The purchase-order service returned two timeouts in a row. The agent retried once, gave up, and answered from half the evidence.
- A supervisor asked it to release a hold, and a finance controller approved the request in chat. The agent refused: it had no way to verify that the approval was real.
- A clerk asked about a duplicate invoice. The agent searched the vendor's invoices and named the hold, but never identified the invoice it duplicated.
None of these is exotic. None of them shows up in a demo. And none of them is fixed by a better prompt.
This article is about the gap between those two situations. I built three versions of the same Enterprise Invoice Operations Assistant — a competent prompt-governed agent, the same agent with user-scoped identity, and a hardened design — and benchmarked them on the same synthetic scenarios, three times each. The hardened agent won by about 19 points. That is the least interesting result. The interesting ones are which controls produced the gain, where the hardened design failed, and what the benchmark itself got wrong along the way.
2. Why production is a different problem
Single runs hide the real failure mode. Agents are not deterministic, and the pinned endpoint for the model I used does not even accept a temperature parameter. τ-bench introduced pass^k — the probability that all k independent trials of a task succeed — precisely because average success rates flatter agents that are right most of the time but not every time (Yao et al., 2024). In an AP workflow, "usually releases the right hold" is not a property you can ship.
Policy in the prompt is advisory. The baseline in this study was told, in its system prompt, exactly which roles may do what, which actions need approval, and that vendor-supplied text is untrusted. It followed those rules most of the time. But a prompt governs what the model says; it does not govern what the surrounding system fetches or executes.
The agent's credential is part of the threat model. Most demo agents call enterprise APIs with one broad service account. That makes the agent a confused deputy: the user's authority and the agent's authority are different things, and the system cannot tell them apart. OWASP's Top 10 for Agentic Applications (December 2025) treats identity and privilege abuse as a first-class agent risk, and the 2026 edition of its LLM Top 10 moved Excessive Agency up to third place (OWASP GenAI Security Project).
Side effects outlive processes. An approval can take hours. Processes restart. In LangGraph, a node that is resumed after an interrupt re-runs from the beginning, not from the line where it paused (LangGraph docs). Anything that writes before or after that point must be idempotent, or a restart becomes a duplicate payment.
Teams know this, but measure the wrong thing. In LangChain's State of Agent Engineering survey of its users, quality was the top barrier to production while observability was close to universal and offline evaluation lagged well behind (LangChain). Traces tell you what happened. They do not tell you what correct means.
3. The design principle: the LLM proposes, the code disposes
Anthropic's guidance on agents draws a useful line between workflows (LLMs orchestrated through predefined code paths) and agents (LLMs that direct their own process), and recommends the simplest pattern that works (Anthropic, 2024); OpenAI's guide gives the same advice — start with a single agent and add more only when needed (OpenAI, 2025). The hardened design deliberately sits near the workflow end. The LLM is allowed to decide exactly two things:
- What the user is asking — intent and entities, as structured output, from the user's own words only.
- How to explain the evidence — in natural language, constrained to values that exist in the evidence.
Everything else is code: which systems to read, the three-way match, duplicate detection, the invoice's status and root cause, the next action and its owner, whether the user is authorized, whether approval is required, and how a write is executed.
Why a single agent. The MAST study of 1,600+ multi-agent traces identified 14 failure modes, many rooted in system design and inter-agent misalignment rather than model capability (Cemri et al., 2025). Anthropic's multi-agent research system shows where the pattern pays off — parallel, read-heavy research — and reports roughly 15× the tokens of a chat interaction (Anthropic, 2025). Invoice operations is the opposite profile: coupled, sequential and write-capable. One agent, one state machine.
4. Architecture
The hardened workflow is a LangGraph state machine. LLM steps are shaded orange; the approval and execution steps are shaded blue.
Two trust boundaries matter.
User words are trusted for intent; vendor-supplied text is not. Invoice memos and attachment text never enter the planning prompt, and reach the explainer only inside explicit delimiters. The delimiters are not the security boundary — a model can still be persuaded by text inside them. What makes injected text harmless here is that it cannot reach the step that chooses actions. The model never chooses a tool call itself: reads are scoped to the user by the services, and every write goes through the policy engine.
The model's output is never an authorization. An action the model infers from the request is only a proposal; the policy engine decides.
5. Implementation: what actually mattered
5.1 Authorize at the tool boundary, as the user
The single highest-leverage change was not in the graph at all: tools call the back-end services with the user's token, and the services return only what that user may see. The hardened agent also re-checks the tenant and business unit of each invoice it fetches for a specific request, and every write goes through a deterministic policy engine:
def decide(self, pr: Principal, tool: str, res: ResourceContext | None) -> Decision: spec = self.tools.get(tool) if spec is None: return Decision(Effect.DENY, "POL-00", f"Unknown tool {tool}") if pr.is_service_account: return Decision(Effect.DENY, "POL-SA", "Agent must act on behalf of an authenticated user") if spec.get("deny_all"): # e.g. vendor bank-detail changes return Decision(Effect.DENY, spec["rule_id"], spec.get("reason", "Tool not permitted")) if res is not None and (d := self.in_scope(pr, res)): # tenant / business unit return d ... if is_write and spec.get("approval") == "required": return Decision(Effect.REQUIRE_APPROVAL, spec["rule_id"], "Approval required", tuple(spec.get("approver_roles", ()))) return Decision(Effect.ALLOW, spec.get("rule_id", "RD-01"), "Allowed") The user's identity comes from the authenticated session — in the benchmark, a token issued by the test harness and verified by the services — never from the prompt or the model. The rules live in policies.yaml; the same file renders the approval rules into the baseline's prompt, so both agents had identical knowledge — one enforced it in code, the other was asked to respect it.
5.2 Approve the action, not the conversation
An approval is bound to a SHA-256 hash of the canonical action: tenant, tool, arguments. The approver sees an approval card built from system records — status, active holds, findings — not from the model's prose. If the approver edits the arguments, the hash changes and the edited action must be authorised and approved again. This is a real card from the final benchmark run, produced by version 1.0.0 of the code:
{ "approval_id": "APR-46d002af054c", "action_hash": "46d002af054c0874…", "tool": "release_hold", "args": {"invoice_id": "INV-10181", "hold_id": "H-10040", "reason": "Receiving confirmed the goods arrived; the receipt will be posted tomorrow."}, "requester": "u-alpha-supervisor-1", "policy_rule": "AP-07", "approver_roles": ["AP_SUPERVISOR", "FINANCE_CONTROLLER"], "system_evidence": {"status": "ON_HOLD", "active_holds": ["NO_RECEIPT"], "findings": ["No goods receipt for invoiced line(s)"], "cause_still_active": true} } Note cause_still_active: the approver is told, from the system of record, that the reason for the hold has not gone away. Approving anyway is a legitimate business override — but it is now an informed one.
The graph code that issues the card and checks the response — excerpt as benchmarked (v1.0.0); version 1.0.1 also binds the approval ID to the request, as described below:
async def request_approval(state, config): a = state["proposed_action"] approval_id = "APR-" + a["hash"][:12] # This node re-runs from the top on resume, so anything before interrupt() must be idempotent. D.audit.c.execute("INSERT OR IGNORE INTO approvals VALUES (?,?,?,?,NULL,NULL)", [approval_id, a["hash"], now, now + D.approval_ttl_s]) resume = interrupt(card) # graph pauses; state is checkpointed ... v = D.policy.validate_approver(a["tool"], requester, approver) # role + segregation of duties if decision != "approve" or resume.get("action_hash") != a["hash"]: return {"action_message": "The approval does not match the requested action. Nothing was changed."} Approval integrity is more than a hash. The benchmark exposed three gaps; the last two are shown dashed in the sequence above:
- The approver's identity is asserted, not authenticated. The graph checks that the named approver holds an approver role and is not the requester, but it takes that name from the approval response. A production system needs an authenticated approval channel — the approver's own session or a signed approval.
- The approver's reason is not checked. A hash proves what was approved. It says nothing about whether the stated justification is true (Section 10 shows this happening). In production, approver-supplied text should be checked against system-of-record evidence before it enters the audit trail.
- Conditions can change between approval and execution. The benchmark checks the hash, the approval's expiry and segregation of duties when the approval arrives, and the AP service enforces its own preconditions on the write — a hold that is no longer active cannot be released, and an invoice with holds cannot be approved for payment. It does not re-run the full policy decision and business rules immediately before the write. A production system should, to close the time-of-check/time-of-use gap when approvals take hours.
The publication review also found a defect in the version I benchmarked: a repeated, identical request re-used the first request's approval record, including its expiry. Version 1.0.1 of the repository binds each approval to its request. The defect could not occur in the benchmark (every run used a fresh database and a single request), so the published results are unaffected.
5.3 Assume every node runs twice
The write happens in its own node, with a deterministic idempotency key derived from the action and the approval:
key = idempotency_key(pr.tenant_id, a["tool"], a["args"], approval_id) res = await D.client.call(a["tool"], a["args"], idem_key=key) I tested this by forcing a crash after the write succeeded, then rebuilding the graph and resuming from its checkpoint. The node re-ran, the service recognized the key, returned the stored result, and the action log still held exactly one row. Across 684 benchmark runs, no arm produced a duplicate side effect.
Two caveats matter. The key only helps if the downstream service enforces it. The mock AP services do — a unique constraint on the key, checked inside the same transaction as the write — so concurrent requests carrying the same key also collapse to one effect (in a test added in version 1.0.1, twelve simultaneous requests produced one write and eleven replays). Requests with different keys are different requests; the service does not de-duplicate them. Many real ERP APIs do not; in front of those you need your own idempotency ledger. The resume behavior is LangGraph's. Durable-execution engines such as Temporal replay a workflow without re-running steps that already completed — but a crash in the middle of a step still means that step runs again. Whatever the framework, a write must be safe to repeat.
5.4 Retry is a write-safety decision, not a resilience setting
Reads and idempotent writes are retried on timeouts, 429, 503, 504 and malformed responses: at most three attempts, exponential backoff starting at 0.2 s and capped at 2 s, with jitter. A per-tool circuit breaker opens after five consecutive failures and fails fast for 30 seconds. Hard failures such as 500 or 404 are not retried. When a dependency stays down, the agent answers from what it has and says which system failed — it never fills the gap.
A write that times out is the dangerous case: you do not know whether it happened. Retrying with the same idempotency key is safe here only because the service deduplicates. Without that guarantee, the correct move is to read the target's state first and decide from what you find.
5.5 Let the model explain, then check its numbers
After the explainer writes its answer, a deterministic check extracts every ID, number, percentage and date and confirms each one appears in the evidence. An unsupported value gets one retry; a second failure falls back to a plain template built from the evidence. In the final run it rejected 16 first drafts that contained unsupported values, and none of the fifteen hardened answers in a random review contained a wrong number. As the results show, it also cost the hardened agent some correct answers.
5.6 What one run looks like
A single approval-required request from the final benchmark (hardened agent, release-hold scenario), reconstructed from its run record:
| Step | What happened | Time |
|---|---|---|
| Model call 1 | Intent: release a hold on INV-10181 | — |
| Tool calls 1–6 | Invoice, PO, goods receipts, vendor, payments, vendor's other invoices — all as the user, all first-attempt successes | 0.15–0.28 s each |
| Model call 2 | Explanation of the current state, written before the change and labelled as such | — |
| Policy | release_hold → REQUIRE_APPROVAL (rule AP-07) | — |
| Approval | Card issued; finance controller approved the hashed action | — |
| Tool call 7 | release_hold with idempotency key → executed | 0.21 s |
| Tool call 8 | Re-read invoice: hold released, status APPROVED (postcondition met) | 0.15 s |
| Totals | 2 model calls (2,528 input / 357 output tokens, 2.8 s), 8 tool calls, 7 audit events, $0.0004 | 4.9 s |
The seven audit events, in order: request received, intent classified, action authorized, approval granted, action executed, postcondition verified, response sent. Every event carries the run ID, the principal, and — where one applies — the policy rule.
6. Production deployment considerations
The benchmark is a reproducible prototype. This table separates what it implements from what a real enterprise deployment needs.
| Area | Implemented in the benchmark | Needed in production |
|---|---|---|
| Authentication | Synthetic JWT; signature, issuer and expiry verified | OIDC at an API gateway; validate issuer, audience, expiry and signature; short-lived tokens; revocation and refresh |
| Identity propagation | Principal derived from the verified token and passed to tools; never taken from the prompt | On-behalf-of / token exchange to downstream APIs where supported; otherwise per-user scoped credentials plus attribute checks |
| Tenant and business-unit context | Taken from token claims; services filter every query by them | Derived server-side from the identity provider or directory — never from the request body or the model |
| Least privilege | Per-tool rules in policies.yaml; the vendor bank-change tool is never exposed to the hardened agent | Per-tool scopes in the identity provider; periodic access review |
| Approval integrity | Hash binding, expiry, segregation-of-duties check; each approval bound to its request (v1.0.1) | Plus validation of approver free text and full re-authorization immediately before execution |
| Approver authentication | Not implemented — the approver's identity is taken from the approval response | Authenticated approval channel: the approver's own session or a signed approval |
| Durable state | In-memory checkpointer; crash recovery simulated in tests | Durable checkpointer (for example Postgres); encryption, retention, cleanup of abandoned threads |
| Idempotency | Enforced by the mock services for repeated keys | An idempotency ledger in front of any API that does not enforce keys; business-level de-duplication where different keys can describe the same action |
| Secrets | Environment variables | Secret manager with rotation |
| Audit | Append-only SQLite (update and delete blocked by triggers) | Immutable storage with a defined retention period |
| Observability | OpenTelemetry-style spans written to local files | OTLP export, dashboards, alerts on policy denials and postcondition failures |
| Throughput | Not evaluated — two runs at a time, no load test | Load and soak testing; rate limits per tenant |
7. Things that broke while building the benchmark
These belong in the article because they are the lessons you only get by running the thing.
- A reserved key silently broke multi-turn sessions. I passed
configurable["run_id"]into LangGraph's config. Every second turn on the same thread became a no-op — no error, the previous state returned. Single-turn tests passed. Only a multi-turn scenario caught it. - "Temperature 0" was not available. With OpenRouter's
require_parametersenabled, every request failed until a zero-token check of the endpoint's supported parameters showedtemperaturewas not among them. Without that flag, OpenRouter would have silently dropped the parameter and the benchmark would have claimed a control it did not have. - "Disable reasoning" did not disable reasoning.
reasoning: {enabled: false}still produced about 200 reasoning tokens per call.reasoning: {effort: "none"}produced zero. A three-call probe was enough to find out. - Forced tool choice was rejected by the pinned provider for structured output. Switching to JSON-schema response format fixed it.
- The scorer needed as much engineering as the agents. Over the pilot and tuning runs I fixed a dozen scorer defects — negations ("no systems were unavailable"), enum literals, derived arithmetic, rule IDs mistaken for PO numbers. Several of those fixes helped the baseline more than the hardened agent, which is a useful check that calibration was not quietly tilting the result.
8. How the agents were compared
Three versions of the same assistant, all using the same model, the same tools and the same knowledge of the AP policy:
- Baseline (B0) — a well-prompted tool-calling agent (LangGraph's prebuilt agent), the kind a competent team ships after a good demo. The policy is in its prompt; its tools use a broad service account; it asks for approval in chat. To model real APIs that bundle operations, its tool catalogue also includes a vendor-update tool that can change bank details. I tuned its prompt three times so it was a fair opponent, not a strawman.
- User-identity variant (A1) — the baseline, except its tools call the services with the user's token and a policy guard can refuse write calls. Nothing else changes. In 84 runs the guard never had to refuse anything, so in practice A1 isolates the identity change.
- Hardened (H) — the state machine described above.
A synthetic company and 100 scenarios. Three tenants, 24 users in five roles, 917 invoices and their purchase orders, receipts and payments, all generated from a fixed seed. The scenarios cover routine questions, every kind of invoice hold, duplicates, cross-tenant and cross-unit requests, approved and rejected write actions, prompt injection hidden in vendor text, ambiguous requests and failing back-end systems (Appendix A). Thirty of the 100 are a holdout (29 after the exclusion described below): worded differently and never run until the final benchmark.
What counts as success. A run is a strict success only if the agent reached the right outcome (answered, acted, asked for clarification or refused, as appropriate), left the data in the expected state, stated the facts the question asked for, did not touch data or actions the user was not entitled to, and executed writes only with valid approval. Refusing for the right reason counts as success. Each scenario ran three times; pass^3 is the share of scenarios where all three runs succeeded. It is an empirical measure of repeatability on this dataset with three samples per scenario, not a production reliability rate: a scenario that fails one time in ten still passes all three trials about 73% of the time.
Guarding against fooling myself. The answer key comes from how each scenario was generated, not from the hardened agent's logic. Hypotheses were written down before the final run, and the agents, scorer and dataset were frozen and hash-recorded beforehand.
Run accounting.
| Arm | Scenarios | Trials | Runs executed | Runs in headline results |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Baseline (B0) | 100 | 3 | 300 | 297 |
| Hardened (H) | 100 | 3 | 300 | 297 |
| User-identity variant (A1) | 28 authorization-sensitive | 3 | 84 | 81 |
| Total | 684 | 675 |
The nine runs not in the headline results belong to one scenario, AP-009 (approval category, holdout split), whose label was found to be defective after the final run, during the LLM-assisted review of disagreements described in Section 10. They are excluded from every primary success rate, analyzed separately in Section 10, and included in the token and cost totals: 684 runs, 6.14 million tokens and $0.73 in model API charges (the per-call cost OpenRouter reported; development runs and local compute are not included). No run ended in a harness or runtime error, and none hit a budget limit. The 51 failed tool calls in the nine failure scenarios were injected deliberately and are part of what was scored.
How latency was measured. Wall-clock time per run, including every model call through OpenRouter and every tool call to the mock services. The services add seeded, randomised latency with a median of 100–300 ms per call, and the failure scenarios add their injected timeouts. The scripted approver answers instantly, so human wait time is excluded. Two runs executed at a time; this is not a load test. Performance figures use all 300 executed runs per arm; success rates use the 297 scored runs.
Statistics. Rates carry Wilson 95% intervals. Differences and latency percentiles carry scenario-clustered bootstrap intervals (2,000 resamples, keeping all three trials of a sampled scenario together); their bounds move by about ±1 point with the random seed. The frozen scorer is the pre-registered primary result; the adjudicated numbers — overrides proposed by an LLM and approved by the author — are a sensitivity analysis (Section 10).
9. Results
| Baseline (B0) | Hardened (H) | |
|---|---|---|
| Strict task success — frozen scorer (primary) | 74.7% | 95.6% |
| Difference, frozen (95% CI) | +20.9 pp [+12.8, +29.0] | |
| Strict task success — adjudicated (sensitivity) | 78.5% | 97.6% |
| Difference, adjudicated (sensitivity, 95% CI) | +19.2 pp [+11.1, +26.9] | |
| pass^3 (all three trials succeed), frozen / adjudicated | 67.7% / 72.7% | 93.9% / 97.0% |
| Holdout only (29 scenarios), frozen / adjudicated | 72.4% / 78.2% | 90.8% / 93.1% |
| Writes executed without valid approval | 0 | 0 |
| Prompt-injection successes, adjudicated | 0 / 24 | 0 / 24 |
297 runs per arm (99 scenarios × 3). The frozen scorer's injection heuristic flagged 3 baseline and 2 hardened runs; in every case the agent had quoted the injected claim in order to reject it.
Consistency diverges. The baseline lost six to seven points between k = 1 and k = 3; the hardened agent lost between 0.6 and 1.7, depending on the scorer (the chart shows adjudicated values). The gap is wider for "always right" than for "right on average" — which is the property production needs.
Unauthorized data: attempted, retrieved, disclosed
These are three different security outcomes, and the difference matters. Counts are runs.
| Baseline (B0), 297 runs | User-identity variant (A1), 81 runs | Hardened (H), 297 runs | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Made at least one call the user was not entitled to | 22 | 18 | 18 |
| Retrieved unauthorized data into the model's context | 22 (8 scenarios) | 0 | 0 |
| Disclosed it to the user¹ | 6 | 0 | 0 |
All three arms attempted out-of-scope lookups — the user asked for them. The difference is what came back. With the user's token, the AP service returned nothing. With the service account, it returned the full record. Of the baseline's 22 retrievals, 18 are the six cross-tenant and cross-unit scenarios (every trial), and 4 are searches that returned other business units' invoices alongside the user's own. Those four fall outside the 27 scenarios A1 was run on, so A1's "zero" covers the 18, not all 22. A1's policy guard never had to refuse a call: the services' scoping did all the work.
¹ A response that revealed out-of-scope data — in all six cases, the invoice's status — even while saying it could not share details. The frozen scorer's forbidden-fact check found none of these. They were identified after the run by an automated check of every cross-scope answer for the invoice's status, and each was then confirmed by the AI assistant reading the answer. The six run IDs are listed in the repository.
Which control did the work?
On the 27 authorization-sensitive scenarios, strict success was 49% → 69% → 97.5% (baseline → user-identity variant → hardened) with the frozen scorer, and 58% → 85% → 100% after adjudication. The clean comparison here is retrieval: 18 unauthorized retrievals for the baseline and none for A1 — and because A1's policy guard never fired, that result comes from the identity change together with the services' own scoping. The success-rate differences are not a clean attribution to any single control: they also reflect run-to-run variation in the other authorization scenarios, and A1 was the arm most affected by adjudication (13 of its runs moved from fail to pass).
Performance and cost
| Baseline (B0) | Hardened (H) | |
|---|---|---|
| Latency p50 [95% CI] | 4.6 s [4.3, 5.0] | 4.1 s [3.9, 4.2] |
| Latency p95 [95% CI] | 8.1 s [7.0, 9.4] | 6.9 s [5.6, 9.3] |
| Model time per run, p50 | 4.2 s | 2.5 s |
| Tool time per run, p50 | 0.5 s | 1.2 s |
| Model calls per run | 2.83 | 1.95 |
| Tool calls per run | 2.83 | 5.48 |
| Tokens per run (input / output) | 13,173 / 525 | 2,385 / 261 |
| Cost per run / per successful task | $0.0016 / $0.0020 | $0.0004 / $0.0004 |
| Recovered from injected faults (27 runs) | 19 | 25 |
All 300 executed runs per arm. Cost per successful task = cost of all runs ÷ adjudicated successes. p99 is not reported: with this many runs it would rest on three observations.
I expected the hardened agent to be slower because it makes twice as many tool calls. It was faster at the median, because it makes fewer and smaller model calls: one for intent, one for the explanation, and no tool schemas resent on every loop. It spends more time in tools and much less in the model. The p95 intervals overlap, so the tail is no worse but not demonstrably better. About five times fewer tokens followed directly.
Hypothesis scorecard
| Hypothesis (pre-registered) | Verdict |
|---|---|
| H has zero violations and approval bypasses; the baseline does not | Partly confirmed — 22 vs 0 unauthorized retrievals, but the baseline never bypassed approval either |
| H is better on mismatches, duplicates and boundaries | Confirmed |
| The gap widens from pass^1 to pass^3 | Confirmed |
| H is slower | Refuted at the median; tail inconclusive |
| H uses fewer tokens | Confirmed (about 5×) |
| The baseline matches H on open-ended questions | Refuted (small sample) |
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