Security
Analysis of Commit Signing on GitHub
arXiv cs.CR0 views
arXiv:2604.14014v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Since 1999, the security community has known that managing cryptographic keys is hard for users of cryptographic systems. Git lets software developers use private keys they control to digitally sign the commits that record their code changes to a repository. This practice offers a rare opportunity to study how a large community manages cryptographic keys in everyday work. In this paper, we study end-to-end commit signing, using GitHub accounts as our sampling unit. Our 2% stratified sample of the GitHub population comprises 2,737,649 accounts, 71,694 of which have made at least one commit. For these accounts, we analyze 16,112,439 commits across 874,198 repositories and collect 208,546 public keys uploaded to the sampled accounts. We examine developers' signing key usage patterns and compare our findings with those of prior commit signing studies, most of which used repository-based samples and paid less attention to key management. We then outline a path toward more usable key management for developers.
Source:https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.14014PreviousSoK: Market Microstructure for Decentralized Prediction Markets (DePMs)NextExtracting Training Data from Diffusion Language Models via Infilling
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