arXiv:2611.25056v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Decentralized multi-agent LLM systems enable independently administered agents, each with its own operator, model, memory, and configuration, to collaborate on complex tasks without centralized coordination. Agents autonomously decompose tasks, execute subtasks and delegate remaining work to peers, enabling scalability and eliminating single points of failure. However, decentralization also introduces significant security challenges, as no single entity has complete visibility into task execution or the authority to enforce correct behavior across agents. In this paper, we systematize threats from malicious agents in decentralized multi-agent systems and propose mitigation techniques. We first design and evaluate attacks against integrity, availability, and confidentiality, demonstrating that a single malicious agent can cause up to 100% task failure, inflate token consumption and runtime by up to 7.7x and 3.2x, respectively, and exfiltrate up to 94% of relevant prior tasks from benign agents. We then present a cryptographic protocol that produces an irrefutable verified execution trace of every action taken in the system and develop an auditor that analyzes these traces to detect and attribute malicious behavior. Evaluations on HiddenBench using gpt-6.1-sol and Qwen3.8-27B-FP8 show that our protocol incurs negligible latency overhead, while the auditor detects and correctly attributes 98% of attacks, including those that comply with the protocol.