1. Basic Information
- Article Title: World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely
- Source: Report URI / Scott Helme
- Publication Date: 2026-11-16
- Collection Date: 2026-11-18T08:00:28+09:00
- Original Source: Report URI
- Related Sources: BleepingComputer, Report URI Official Blog, Optimizely Incident
- Severity (Author Priority): Critical
- Basis for Severity: 188 tampered snippets were delivered from official Optimizely distribution channels to the sites of 178 organizations, and cryptocurrency address replacement, card skimming, cookie and screenshot exfiltration, and iOS exploit kit delivery were observed.
2. Quick Summary
Attackers injected a loader into Optimizely Experimentation Project JavaScript, delivering multi-purpose malware to visitors of customer sites that trust the official CDN.
3. Attack Flow
In the common distribution stage, attackers tamper with Project JavaScript to deliver an external loader or inline fallback from the official snippet. The following are independent functions and target-specific paths included in the same payload, and do not indicate an execution sequence of A to B to C to D. The source is Report URI's payload analysis.
Attack Path A: Cryptocurrency Address Replacement
- Detects wallet addresses in the browser and replaces wallet addresses in page content, input fields, clipboard contents, and outgoing data with the attacker's addresses.
- When users send funds to the replacement address, it leads to financial loss. Report URI has reported transactions to the attacker's wallet, but the total financial loss and number of victims from this campaign remain unconfirmed.
Attack Path B: Card Skimming
- Detects card numbers, expiration dates, and CVVs from the site's own forms or fetch/XHR POST requests.
- When all three items are present, the implementation sends them to
card.php. Inputs within external hosted payment iframes are excluded. The actual number of payment card records exfiltrated is unknown.
Attack Path C: Cookie and Page Image Exfiltration
- When replacing addresses near text related to wallets or payments, it collects URLs, original addresses, non-
HttpOnlycookies, and page images via html2canvas. - The implementation sends them to
hit.php. This is not a function to capture all cookies or the entire OS screen, and the number of collection reports that actually reached the endpoint is unknown.
Attack Path D: iOS Exploit Delivery
- Loads
boot.json iPhones and iPads, and redirects users to Coruna or DarkSword via hidden iframes based on the OS version. - While analysis results for delivery and redirection exist, successful exploitation on devices remains unconfirmed.
4. Attacker Position and Execution Location
- Attackers gained the ability to write to the JavaScript settings of Optimizely customer projects. The visitor-side payload executes within the browser from the official CDN.
5. Appearance to Victims and Administrators
- Victims: Because they are viewing and making payments on normal legitimate sites, it is difficult to determine anomalies from appearance alone.
- Administrators: Even without modifying internal code, anomalies can be observed through changes in Optimizely snippet hash values, connections to external domains, and CSP violations.
6. Success and Failure Conditions
- Success Conditions: The tampered snippet must load, and execution of the external loader or inline fallback must be permitted. Card information exfiltration requires inputs readable from the page, cookie exfiltration requires non-
HttpOnlycookies, and the iOS path requires a compatible device and version. - Blocking Execution and Transmission: Script, frame, and destination limits are enforced by stopping snippets, removing code, and applying an appropriate CSP. Blocking attack domains alone cannot stop the execution of inline fallbacks.
- Detection and Containment: Hash monitoring and diff monitoring are detection mechanisms and distinct from automatic blocking. Handle containment for compromised Optimizely accounts separately from containment for visitor sessions affected by exposed cookies; revoke affected sessions and rotate relevant tokens as appropriate.
7. What Happens Upon Success
- Cryptocurrency destination replacement, exfiltration of payment card inputs readable from pages, non-
HttpOnlycookies, and page images, and iOS exploit delivery may occur.
8. Observable Logs
- Email: No special notes.
- Proxy / SWG / DNS: Browser communications to destinations such as
1688360[.]cc, and external transmissions immediately following the retrieval of Optimizely snippets. - Endpoint / EDR: Abnormal downloads by the browser process or post-exploit behavior on the iOS side. Success cannot be determined by browser communication alone.
- Identity / IdP: Suspicious logins to Optimizely projects or accounts, token usage, and session modifications.
- SaaS / Cloud: Project JavaScript modification history, snippet hash values, administrative operations, and token revocation.
- Network: Connections to unknown domains following retrieval from the official CDN, data POST requests, and traffic associated with cryptocurrency address replacement.
9. Attack Success Determination
- Common Distribution Stage / Public Information: Report URI confirmed malicious code in 188 of 1,611 snippets across 178 organizations. This does not indicate that execution succeeded on an equivalent number of visitor terminals.
- Path A / Public Information: Report URI reported cryptocurrency theft and transactions to the attacker's wallet. Total financial loss and the number of victims resulting from this campaign are unconfirmed.
- Path B and C / Public Information: Code for collecting and transmitting card information and cookies has been confirmed, but the actual number of payment card records and cookies transmitted is unknown. The presence of code alone does not mean information exfiltration succeeded.
- Path D / Public Information: Delivery and redirection of iOS exploit kits have been reported, but successful exploitation on individual devices remains unconfirmed.
10. Investigation Playbook
- Trigger: Changes in Optimizely snippet hash values, CSP violations, and communication with
1688360[.]cc. - Initial Checks: Identify the project ID used, retrieval time, response body and headers, CSP enforcement results, and visitor sessions.
- Endpoint: Preserve browser history, download history, cookie usage status, and iOS telemetry.
- Identity and Cloud: Review Optimizely accounts, project modification history, tokens, sessions, and administrator actions.
- Follow-On: Track payment data, cookie reuse, cryptocurrency addresses, and additional payloads.
- Containment: Disable affected snippets or update them to remove the malicious code, as appropriate; rotate tokens, strengthen CSP, and determine whether to notify affected visitors.
- Classification: Separate and classify code delivery, browser execution, data retrieval, external transmission, and successful exploitation.
11. Defense and Detection Ideas
- Single Event: Communication from third-party scripts to unauthorized domains, and modifications to Project JavaScript.
- Time Series: Correlate snippet modification -> retrieval by visitor -> external loader loading -> data transmission.
- Hunting: Review Optimizely responses, CSP reports, and browser proxy logs from the relevant period for known IOCs.
- Logging Gaps: Even if the CDN is legitimate, content can be tampered with. Domain allowlists alone cannot detect this.
- Priority Controls: Prioritize third-party JavaScript inventory management, CSP, change monitoring, and SaaS administrator MFA and token management.
12. Facts / Inference / Hypothesis
Facts
- Report URI examined 1,611 snippets and confirmed malicious code in 188 snippets belonging to 178 organizations.
- Optimizely acknowledged that a vulnerability in Experimentation had been exploited to add malicious JavaScript to customer projects, and publicized vulnerability remediation, code removal, and protection of affected accounts.
- Payloads included wallet replacement, skimming of page-readable card inputs, acquisition of non-
HttpOnlycookies and page images, and iOS exploit kit distribution features.
Inference
- A CSP that only permits legitimate third-party domains may fail to stop tampered code delivered from the same domain.
Hypothesis
No additional hypotheses. Unconfirmed items are listed in "Unknowns and Additional Investigation".
13. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| ID | Technique | Confidence | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1195.002 | Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain | high | Common distribution stage: Tampering with official Project JavaScript distribution paths confirmed. Source |
| T1189 | Drive-by Compromise | high | Path D: Analyzed iOS exploit delivery targeting visitors. Terminal compromise success unconfirmed. Source |
| T1539 | Steal Web Session Cookie | medium | Path C: Collection and transmission code confirmed for non-HttpOnly cookies. Actual exfiltration count unknown. Source |
| T1056.003 | Input Capture: Web Portal Capture | medium | Path B: Page-level form input skimming code confirmed. Hosted payment iframes excluded, exfiltration count unknown. Source |
14. Unknowns and Additional Investigation
- While Optimizely has acknowledged vulnerability exploitation, the specific initial intrusion vectors and privilege acquisition paths that enabled cross-customer writes have not been made public.
- The total number of impacted projects, compromised visitors, exfiltrated data, successful iOS exploits, and specific session/token treatments for affected account protection remain unconfirmed.
15. Impact on SOCs and Organizations
Even if your organization does not directly use Optimizely on its own sites, it is necessary to inventory third-party JavaScript used in payment portals, public relations sites, and SaaS portals, and maintain monitoring systems that do not blindly trust official CDNs.
16. Audience-Specific Summary
- For SOCs: Correlate snippet hash values, CSP reports, proxies, and browser telemetry chronologically.
- For Administrators: Check Optimizely project modification history and tokens, and enable strict CSP and third-party script monitoring.
- For Users: If you made a payment on an affected site during the target period, check operator guidance and credit card statements.