arXiv:2605.07671v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: An agent's probability report is paid for twice: by a strictly proper scoring rule, which rewards accuracy, and by an approval rule for the decision it triggers. An approval rule that is not affine is known to defeat truthful reporting. We show the conflict is built in: whenever perfect screening is attainable, the welfare-maximizing approval rule is never affine. The distortion is predictable: there is a reserve report at which pretending to be the marginal type costs exactly what approval is worth. Approving every report at or above the reserve sorts agents as if their beliefs were observed, under every strictly proper score and for any belief distribution. So does a continuous rule with one corner; under strict feasibility no continuously differentiable rule does. The binding constraint is steepness, not smoothness: a slope-capped rule sorts perfectly if and only if the cap reaches the critical slope, the steepest chord of the pretending cost up to the reserve; below it the welfare loss is cubic in the shortfall. For the Brier, log and power scores, and whenever the pretending cost is convex up to the reserve, the critical slope has a closed form. The instances are AI-agent oversight and marketplace operation.