The scenario is fictional (RFC 5737 IPs). The awk and SUID diff were run on synthetic data; auditd rules come from the book and are untested live.
A web-service account (uid=33) running a shell with euid=0 is the signature of SUID/sudo escalation.
What you'll learn
- The auditd rule:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -C uid!=euid -F euid=0 -k suid_exec - Why my book's awk one-liner returned zero hits
- A field-wise detector that works
- SUID baseline diffing
The bug
The book used /uid=/ && /euid=0/ && !/uid=0/. But euid=0 itself contains uid=0, so the negation excludes every line. Verified on synthetic logs: 0 hits.
Fixed version, comparing fields:
awk '{u="";e="";c=""; for(i=1;i<=NF;i++){ if($i ~ /^uid=/) u=substr($i,5); if($i ~ /^euid=/) e=substr($i,6); if($i ~ /^comm=/) c=$i } if(e==0 && u!=0 && c ~ /"(sh|bash|dash)"/) print u, c}' It flags only the uid=33 euid=0 comm="sh" line.
SUID baseline
find / -xdev -perm -4000 -type f | sort into a baseline, then diff periodically. In the test, a chmod u+s showed up as exactly one diff line and chmod u-s cleared it.
Next: sudo misconfiguration and shell escapes.
Adapted from chapter 25 of my Japanese book on server defense.
