Aqua Security details GhostMap, a concealment component identified in IronWorm malware samples distributed via compromised software packages.

Learn how the stealth tool hides selected processes and network connections.

GhostMap does the hiding; it's not the entire malware. Aqua examined IronWorm, which was distributed via compromised software packages. Previous research had reported that IronWorm targeted developer secrets, such as login credentials and digital access keys.

How GhostMap was installed

The researchers examined the file included in the package [email protected]When they ran it with administrator privileges, the file copied itself elsewhere on the system and created a service that remained installed. The service launched GhostMap.

The test did not show that the program could obtain administrator privileges on its own or start without them.

What could he be hiding?

In tests, some programs didn't appear in a regular list of what was running. However, researchers were able to find them from other parts of the system. They reappeared in the lists when GhostMap was stopped.

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The connection used by IronWorm did not appear in any of the connection lists in all three tests. However, another check still showed it, without revealing which program had opened it.

Aqua also found program names and internal structures in the Atomic Arch sample that matched GhostMap. This does not prove that the two campaigns were run by the same operator. The detailed testing of what it could hide and how it could be detected was on the IronWorm sample that Aqua tested.

What did Aqua's tool detect?

Aqua's Tracee tool detected three programs that could change data in the memory of other applications. In the test, it recorded all 48 calls involving reading directories. This suggests that it was able to detect the activity, not prevent it.

Aqua confirmed that IronWorm stored test data on the system itself. It did not observe any successful sending of data outside the system, nor did it confirm successful execution of remotely authenticated commands.

For systems that may have been exposed, Aqua suggests comparing the lists of programs seen with preserved executables and known paths. /proc/PIDIt also suggests checking for unrecognized services and programs associated with eBPF. Before removing a suspicious file, administrators should keep its information and any additional information stored with it.

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